Victor L. Peterson v. William D. Callister et al : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Victor L. Peterson v. William D. Callister et al : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Frandsen and Keller; F. Bennion Redd; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Peterson v. Callister, No. 8584 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2695
IN THE SUPREME, COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
AP'R 1 5 1957 
VICTOR L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-------------
Clerk. Supt e~e ~ourt, 1 :~~~;:-· 
vs. 
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER, 
et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8584 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
FRANDSEN AND KELLER 
By Duane A. Frandsen 
Price, Utah 
F. BENNION REDD 
Monticello, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 5 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ____________________ 6 
ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENTS POINTS ____________________ 13 
POINT 1. DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM AS-
SERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTER-
EST TO THE LAND OR FROM SETTING UP 
AN:¥ DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT BY THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS WHERE THE PROPERTY IS 
ACQUIRED UNDER TAX TITLE ________________________ 13 
POINT 2. DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM AS-
SERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTER-
EST TO THE LAND OR FROM SETTING UP 
ANY DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S COM-
PLAINT BY THE GENERAL 7 YEAR STA-
TUTE OF LIMITATIONS ______________________________________ 16 
POINT 3. PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID TITLE TO 
THE PROPERTY UNDER THE 4 YEAR STA-
TUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON TAX TITLES 
PLUS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION DURING 
THIS PERIOD AND THE PAYMENT OF 
TAXES DURING THE 4 YEAR PERIOD ____________ 17 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------19 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Bowen vs. Olsen, 2 Ut. 2d 12, 268 P. 2d 983 ______________________ 18 
Farrer vs. Johnson, 271 P. 2d 462, 2 Ut. 2d 189 ____________ 10, 17 
Hansen vs. Morris, 3 Ut. 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884 ________________ 18 
Neponset Land & Livestock Co. vs. Dixon, 10 Ut. 334, 
37 p. 573 --------------------------------------------------------------------------11 
Toland vs. Corey, 6 Ut. 392, 24 P. 190 ________________________________ 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 1-1-15 ______________________ 7 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 57-1-6 ----------------------11 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 57-4-4 ______________________ 9 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 59-10-65 __________________ 19 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-12-5 ____________________ 17 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-12-6 ____________________ 17 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-12-5.1 ____ 13, 14, 16 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-12-5.2 ____ 13, 14, 16 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-12-5.3 ________________ 14 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-12-7.1 ________________ 15 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, Section 80-10-68 ______________ 8, 15 
Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapter 19, Section 104-2-5 __________ 13 
Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapter 19, 
Section 104-2-5.10 ______________________________________________________ 13. 14 
Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapter 19, 
Section 104-2-5.11 ____________________________________________________________ 14 
Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapter 19, 
Section 104-2-7 ------------------------------------------------------------------15 
MISCELLANEOUS 
1 Am. Jur. page 155, Section 1 --~------------------------------------------- 8 
20 Am. Jur. page 17,J,, Section 170 & 171 ______________________________ 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER, 
et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8584 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant has given an accurate statement of 
the facts in his brief excepting statements made in 
Paragraph 2 on Page 4. The appellant's statement, 
however, emphasizes claimed irregularities support-
ing plaintiff's title. 
The record discloses that the land in question 
was patented to Freeland Bales on November 8, 1926, 
but that he did not record this patent until August 5, 
1930 (Page 1, abstract of title, plaintiff's Exhibit A). 
One vear after he received this patent he allowed the 
taxes to go delinquent and never did pay the taxes for 
1927 nor any other subsequent years. This property 
went to tax sale to San Juan County in 1927. The tax 
sale was not redeemed. Taxes for the subsequent 
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years, 1928, 1929 and 1930, were not paid and on 
March 12, 1932, an Auditor's Tax Deed was issued 
conveying the property to San Juan County because 
of the nonpayment of taxes by the original owner. 
The original owner did nothing about paying 
these delinquent taxes or purchasing the property 
from the County. Title to the property remained in 
San Juan County for a period of 8 years from 1932 to 
1940, at which time the plaintiff contracted the San 
Juan County Commissioners and arranged to pur-
chase the property under a contract of sale. Plaintiff 
paid the agreed consideration to the County, and a 
Tax Deed was issued to him on February 9, 1944 
(Page 3, abstract of title, plaintiff's Exhibit A). The 
plaintiff has each year since 1944 paid the taxes in 
full either by payment before they were delinquent 
or by redeeming them during their redemption per-
iod. 
The original owner, Freeland Bales, did nothing 
with the land and apparently n1ade no claim to it, 
and on September 1, 1948, he executed a Quitclaim 
Deed to William D. Callister, defendant and appel-
lant herein, for the sum of $10.00 and other considera-
tion (Page 4, abstract of title, plaintiff's Exhibit 
A). Mr. Callister did nothing with the land, paid no 
taxes, but after land values had risen in San Juan 
County and after the plaintiff had cultivated and im-
proved the property and made it an operating farm, 
and after plaintiff filed his suit to quiet titlf'. defend-
ant, after a lapse of time of approximate!:~ 29 :Tears 
fron1 the thn(\ of the first delinquent tax sale in 1927, 
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comes into Court and defends the action and claims 
that he is the owner . 
.At page 4, paragraph 2, of appellant's brief, ap-
pellant states that in the .Auditor's Tax Deed there is 
no reference to the year for which the property was 
assessed and later on in his brief claims that this is 
fatally defective. The .Auditor's Tax Deed which ap-
pears at page 2 of the abstract of title, plaintiff's 
Exhibit A, does state the year for which the taxes 
were assessed and not paid. The following language 
appears on page 2 of the abstract. 
"Deed issued pursuant to Certificate of 
Sale by E. L. Jones, as County Treasurer of 
San Juan County, dated December 21, 1927, for 
delinquent taxes in the amount of $32.7 4." 
The appellant's statement of fact mentions that 
Exhibit B shows the payment of taxes. The taxes 
were paid before they were delinquent by Victor L. 
Peterson for 4 consecutive years befo~e the law suit 
was filed, 1951 to 1954 inclusive. This same Exhibit 
also shows that he paid the taxes before they were 
delinguent for 1955, but this payment was made after 
the suit was commenced. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection with this appeal the appellant has 
argued his case under 4 separate headings. For the 
purpose of replying to the argument of appellant, 
respondent will answer each of appellant's points, 
and then submit argument supporting respondant's 
points which are as follows: 
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1. Defendant is barred from asserting any right, 
title or interest to the land or from setting up any de-
fense to plaintiff's complaint by the 4 year statute 
of limitations where the property is acquired under 
tax title. 
2. Defendant is barred from asserting any right, 
title or interest to the land or from setting up any de-
fense to plaintiff's complaint by the general 7 year 
statute of limitations. 
3. Plaintiff has a valid title to the property un-
der the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles plus 
exclusive possession during this period and the pay-
ment of taxes during the 4 year period. 
ANSWER TO APPELLANT'S ARGU:JIEXT 
Defendant's point No. 1 is that '"Plaintiff has 
not established a valid tax title.'' In answer to this 
point plaintiff admits that it has not established a 
valid title through the tax proceedings alone, because 
as stipulated at the trial, the Auditor's Affidavit was 
not attached to the 1927 tax sale record. \Y e admit 
this but assert that we do not admit all of the proceed-
ings in the tax sale being invalid. \Ye do rely on the 
issuance of an Auditor's Tax Deed in1932 conveying 
this property to San Juan County for nonpayment of 
taxes and the subsequent purchase of this tax title by 
the plaintiff from San Juan County in l~l±-!. At the 
time of the purchase of this land fro1n San Juan 
County on February 6, 1940 (Page :3. plaintiff's Ex-
hibit A) plaintiff went illto possession of the prop-
erty in 1943 and has farn1ed the land, grazed it. 
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fenced it, cut wood and posts from it, and held it 
openly, continuously and adverse to the defendant 
and to the exclusion of the defendant. He has also 
paid the taxes and has established a title by adverse 
possession under the 4 year statute for tax titles 
which will be discussed later on as plaintiff's point 
No.3. 
As point No. 2 defendant states ''Plaintiff has 
failed to establish any title whatsoever." In answer 
to this claim plaintiff relies on the Auditor's Tax 
Deed at page 2 of the abstract, plaintiff's Exhibit A, 
and the Tax Deed from San Juan County to plaintiff 
at page 3 of the same abstract and exhibit. Defendant 
claims that these instruments are defective in that 
they do not show they are witnessed and do not 
show an acknowledgment. These instruments were 
not set forth in full in the abstract and were not 
intended as full instruments. They are both briefed 
down as abstract entries and under Section 1-1-15, 
UOA, 1953, are prima facie evidence of their con-
tents. If defendant claims that the Auditor's Tax 
Deed and the Tax Deed from the County to the 
Plaintiff were defective in the abstract and the 
abstract did not correctly show the instruments or 
their contents briefed down, defendant should have 
then gone forward and introduced the entire in-
struments in evidence. They were both recorded 
and available for the defendant to introduce as evi-
dence at the trial if he claimed that they were defec-
tive in any way. 
The abstract of title showing the conveyances 
against a particular tract of land is hy natnr<' briefed 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
down and it does not purport to show the instruments 
in full nor all of the recitations in the instruments. 
An abstract of title is defined as follows: 
"An abstract of title is a compilation in 
orderly arrangement and abridged form of the 
materials and facts of record affecting title to 
a specific piece of land . . . a short methodical 
summary of the documents and instruments of 
record, ... a short account of the state of the 
title, or a synopsis of the instruments which 
show title, ... It is not the complete evidence 
of the title, but a synopsis of the data as to the 
ti tie.'' 1 Am. J ur. page 155, Section 1. 
There is no requirement in the laws that the sig-
nature to a Deed must be witnessed. As a rna tter of 
practice many deeds do show the name of the indivi-
dual who witnessed the Grantor sign, but it is not es-
sential for the validity of the deed. 
Defendant claims that the instruments are also 
defective because there is no acknowledgement shown 
on these two abstract entries. The fact that the ab-
stracter did not show an acknowledgement on these 
two entries is not conclusive that there were no nc-
knowledgements on the original instruments. As 
stated above, if defendant claims the lack of an ac-
knowledgement as a rlefeet in the instrmnent he 
should have introduced the full instrun1ent in evi-
dence to negative the prima facie showing of these 
two Deeds by the abstract (•ntri(•s. 
Section 80-10-68, UCA. 194~1, sets forth the forn1 
for a Tax Deed and reeites that this Deed "'shall be 
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prima facie evidence of all proceedings subsequent 
to the preliminary sale and of the conveyance of the 
property to the Grantee in fee simple.'' The Tax 
Deed at page 3 of the abstract, plaintiff's Exhibit A, 
conforms exactly to the form set forth in this Section. 
This form does not prescribe any acknowledgement 
and does not show any requirement for the signature 
of the Auditor to be witnessed. This instrument is, 
therefore, prima facie evidence of the regularity of 
all the pocedings and of the conveyance to San Juan 
County by Auditor's Tax Deed and the subsequent 
conveyance by the County of the property to Victor 
L. Peterson in fee simple, excepting only the admis-
sion at the trial that the Auditor's Affidavit was not 
attached to the 1927 tax sale. All the other proceed-
ings to and including the issuance of the deed to 
plaintiff are presumed to be regular. Under this 
statute theAuditor 's Tax Deed would, therefore, be 
presumed to be regular in all respects and to convey 
a fee simple title as far as the form and contents of 
the Auditor's Tax Deed is concerned, and if defend-
ant claimed to the contrary he would have the burden 
of coming forward with proof to show that the Audi-
tor's Tax Deed was defective in so1ne respect. 
Section 57-4-4, UCA, 1953, validates all instru-
ments recorded prior to January 1, 1943, notwith-
standing any defect, omission or informality in the 
acknowledgement of the instrument. The Auditor's / 
Tax Deed issued March 12, 1932, would, therefore, 
be validated under this section even if there were a 
defect or omission in the acknowledgement of this in-
strument. 
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There is also a presumption that public officers 
have complied with the law in the execution, delivery 
and recording of the Auditor's Tax Deed and the Tax 
Deed from San Juan County. 20 Am. Jur. beginning 
at page 174 provides: 
Section 170. ''In the absence of any proof 
to the contrary there is a very strong presump-
tion ... that public officers have properly dis-
charged the duties of their office and performed 
faithfully those matters with which they are 
charged.'' 
Section 171. ''The presumptions that pub-
lic officers discharge the duties of the office 
and that in the discharge of such duties observe 
all the necessary and proper formalities im-
posed by la-w are applicable to all Federal, State, 
County and J\funicipal officers of high or low 
rank and to the official duties and acts of Public 
Boards and Commissions ... It is the settled and 
well entrenched policy of the law to indulge in 
every reasonable presumption in favor of sus-
taining the ministerial acts of officers.'' 
There would, therefore, be a presumption that these 
acknowledgements, if they \-vere required. were in 
proper form and signed and the burden would again 
be upon the defendant to come forward with proof to 
show the contrar~r. Farrer y· s. Johnson, 271 P 2d 
462, 2 Utah 2d 189 (1954). 
The only purpose for an acknowledge1nent is to 
add formalit~r to the execution of an instrun1ent so 
that it can be recorded. Failure to aekno\Yledge a 
10 
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deed of conveyance does not render the instrument 
void or invalid as between the parties. See 57-1-6, 
U CA, 1953, states that a deed 
'' ... shall be valid and binding between the par-
ties thereto without such proofs, acknowledge-
ment, certification or record and as to all other 
persons who have had actual notice." 
Plaintiff was in actual possession of the land in 1948 
when defendant received his deed and defendant 
would, therefore, be charged with notice of plain-
tiff's ownership and claim to the land. See Toland 
Vs. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190, affirmed 154 U.S. 
499; Neponset Land and Livestock Co. V s. Dixon, 10 
Utah 334,37 P. 573. The Auditor's Tax Deed and the 
Tax Deed from San Juan County would, therefore, 
be valid as between the defendant and San Juan 
County and the Plaintiff. 
Defendant's argument and the citations as to the 
manner of acknowledging and proving conveyances 
has no application here because they apply only as to 
whether the instruments are admissable in evidence. 
Both instruments were admitted in evidence in plain-
tiff's Exhibit A under the signature and seal of the 
Abstract Company. 
As defendant's point 3 he asserts ''The legal 
title holder is not barred by the 4 year adverse pos-
session or limitations statutes on tax titles." In sup-
port of this claim defendant states that plaintiff has 
failed to show that the title was acquired by plaintiff 
in the course of a statuatory proceeding for the liq-
11 
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uida tion of a tax levied against the property and to 
show that the propert is relieved from a tax lien. 
Plaintiff overlooks the recitations in the last para-
graphs of the two Deeds at page 2 and 3 of the ab-
stract, plaintiff's Exhibit A. Both recite that the 
taxes on the land were delinquent and that there was 
a preliminary sale in 1927. This claim is an after-
thought by the defendant because his counsel at page 
15, lines 20 to 25 of the transcript admits that the 
property was sold for non-payment of taxes in 1927. 
Plaintiff was not required to introduce in evi-
dence the Certificate of Sale as claimed by the de-
fendant. The Auditor's Tax Deed and the Tax Deed 
from San Juan County were both prima facie evi-
dence of the regularity of the proceedings prior to 
their issuance. 
That defendant is barred by the 4 year statute of 
limitations on tax titles will be discussed hereafter in 
plaintiff's points Nos. 1 and 3 . 
.As point No. 4 defendant asserts '• Legal title 
holder is not barred by the 7 year adverse possession 
or limitation statutes." In answer to this claim plain-
tiff admits that the evidence does not show payn1ent 
of taxes before they were delinquent for a period of 
7 consecutive years, but plaintiff was in actual pos-
session of this property since 1943, which is a period 
in excess of 7 years. This possession was open, no-
torious, exclusive and adverse to the defendant, as 
stated above, and was to the exclusion of the defend-
ant. There is no evidence that defendant 'yas in pos-
session of the land at an~· tin1e after 1932 when the 
.Auditor's Tax Deed was issnrrl. and defendant n1akes 
1~ 
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no claim that he was in actual possession of the land 
after that date. Under the provisions of 104-2-5 and 
104-2-5.10 of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1951, which 
are now Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5, 2, U CA, 1953, 
defendant is barred from asserting any claim or title 
or setting up any defense to plaintiff's complaint. 
'This problem will be further discussed under 
plaintiff's point No. 2. 
As conclusions defendant asks that the lower 
Court be reversed and that a Decree be entered 
against the plaintiff in favor of the defendant and 
appellant herein adjudging and decreeing that de-
fendant is the owner in fee simple of the land in-
volved in the suit. In this demand defendant exceeds 
the prayer of his complaint. In the prayer of his coin-
plaint defendant does not ask for any affirmative 
relief but only asks that the plaintiff take nothing 
by his Complaint. Defendant only filed an Ansvvrer, 
and there is no Counter Claim or Cross Complaint. 
Defendant is, therefore, not entitled to any affirma-
tive relief, and there should be no Decree quieting 
title in the defendant, even if the court found that 
plaintiff was not entitled to have title quieted in him. 
The most that could be done would be to send the 
case back for new trial or to set aside the Findings 
and Decree Quieting Title in the Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM AS-
SERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST 
]3 
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TO THE LAND OR FROM SETTING UP ANY 
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BY 
THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WHERE THE PROPERTY IS ACQUIRED UN-
DER TAX TITLE. 
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, U CA, 1953, set 
up the 4 year statute of limitations against the orginal 
owner where property has been acquired under tax 
title and is held and possessed by the new tax title 
purchaser. These two sections were formerly Sec-
tions 104-2-5 and 104-2-5.10 of the 1943 code as 
amended and enacted by Chapter 19 of the 1951 ses-
sion laws. Seetion 78-12-5.3, UC.A., 1953, which was 
formerly Section 104-2-5.11 of the 1943 code enacted 
by Chapter 19 of the 1951 session laws defines what 
is a tax title. In order to come within this definition 
the tax title does not have to be valid. In the words 
of this section it states ''Whether valid or not.'' The 
tax title under these 3 Sections quoted in this para-
graph originated by the Auditor's Tax Deed issued 
to San Juan County in 1932, which appears at page 
2 of the abstrart of title, plaintiff's Exhibit .L~· This 
Auditor's Tax Deed by its very terms is one of the 
instrun1ents issued 'vhere the original owner has 
failed to pay the taxes and they have gone delinquent 
for a period of 4 years, after 'Yhich tin1e the County 
was authorized to issue an Auditor's Tax Deed con-
veying the property to San Juan County. The term 
''Auditor's Tax Deed'' brings it within the provisions 
of Section 78-12-5.3 and shows that it was issued to 
relieve property for the non-payment of taxes by the 
original owner. In addition to this the deed itself re- _ 
<·.ites that th<\ 1927 tnx<•s were delinquent, not paid, 
J -l 
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and there was a tax sale on December 21, 1927, for 
these delinquent taxes. A period of 24 years has 
elapsed since this Deed was issued, and the original 
owner is now barred from attempting to assert his 
title. 
Argument is made by the defendant that the 
Auditor's Tax Deed as it appears in the abstract 
entry is fatally defective. This question has already 
been answered heretofore in this brief. As hereto-
fore stated Section 80-10-68, UCA, 1943, provides 
that the tax deed issued by San Juan County to the 
plaintiff herein which appears at page 3 of the ab-
stract, plaintiff's Exhibit A, makes all of the tax 
proceedings including the Auditor's Tax Deed and 
Tax Deed from San Juan County prima facie, reg-
ular and valid. This same Tax Deed from San Juan 
County also recites that the taxes for 1927, 1928 and 
1929 and 1930 were not paid by the original owner 
and that this tax title deed was issued by reason 
thereof. 
Plaintiff's title is based on a tax title and sec-
tion 104-2-7, UCA, 1943, as amended by Chapter 19, 
1951 Session Laws, which is now Section 78-12-7.1, 
UCA, 1953, states that "He (the plaintiff herein) 
shall be presumed to be the owner of such property 
by adverse possession . . . " because defendant has 
not been in possession and plaintiff has paid the 
taxes for more than 4 years. 
Plaintiff has been in actual possession of the 
land since 1943 and has occuppied, farmed and 
grazed the area continuously since then. Defendant 
15 
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has not been in possession of the land since prior to 
1932 and makes no claim that he was. 
The lower Court found that plaintiff's title was 
derived from a tax title more than 4 years prior to 
bringing this action and that plaintiff had been in 
possession to the exclusion of defendant since 1943. 
There is an abundance of evidence to support these 
findings by the trial court to bring the case under 
these 2 statutes and the trial court should be sus-
tained therein. 
POINT 2 
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM AS-
SERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST 
TO THE LAND OR FROl\1 SETTING UP ANY 
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S CO:JIPLAIXT BY 
THE GENERAL 7 YEAR STATUTE OF LI:JII-
TATIONS. 
These same sections mentioned above, 78-12-5.1 
and 78-12-5.2, UCA, 1953, give a general statute of 
limitations for a 7 year period and the 7 year fea-
ture of the same statutes also bar the defendant 
from asserting his claim in this action. Plaintiff 
has been in possession and more than 7 ~·ears has 
expired since the Tax Deed ·was issued to the plain-
tiff in 1944. The argument supporting Plaintiff's 
point No. 1 is also applicable to this 7 ~·e~n· statute 
of limitations. The only difference between the 2 
provisions of the same statutes is the period of tin1e. 
Any presun1ption that defendant Inay claim by 
r<'af-1011 of the patent issued to the patentee and de-
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fendant's Quitclaim Deed from the patentee of the 
effect that the owner under a Deed is presumed to 
be in possession is overcome by the facts and evi-
dence in this case showing that plaintiff has actu-
ally been in open, notorious, exclusive and adverse 
possession of this property since and including 1943. 
The facts in this case come within the provisions 
of the Utah case Farrer vs. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 
271 P. 2d 462, which by part of the decision held 
that the plaintiff in that case were barred from as-
serting their title under the 7 year statute of limi-
tations, 78-12-5 and 78-12-6, UCA, 1953, and held 
that the parties holding this property under adverse 
possession were entitled to have title quieted in them. 
POINT 3. 
PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID TITLE TO 
THE PROPERTY UNDER THE 4 YEAR STA-
TUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON TAX TITLES 
PLUS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION DURING 
THIS PERIOD AND THE PAYMENT OF 
TAXES DURING THE 4 YEAR PERIOD. 
In addition to the defendant being barred by 
the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles and 
the general 7 year statute of limitations, both dis-
cussed above, in plaintiff's points Nos. 1 and 2, plain-
tiff has initiated a new and valid title by being 
fendant has initiated a new and valid title by being 
in open, notorious and adverse possession of prop-
erty since 1943 (See page 12 of defendant's brief 
for supporting statement of facts.) and paying the 
taxes for more than 4 years. Plaintiff has paid the 
taxes before they became delinquent on said prop-
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erty for the years 1951 to 1955 inclusive, in e~cess 
of 4 years. (Plaintiff's Exhibit B) 
Plaintiff could establish a new and valid title 
by adverse possession under the general 7 year sta-
tute except for the fact that the taxes were not paid 
before they became delinquent for a period of 7 
consecutive years and under the court's ruling in 
Bowen vs. Olsen 2 Utah 2nd 12, 268P. 2d 983, that 
redeeming the delinquent taxes for some of these 
years is not the same as payment. Except for these 
taxes being redeemed rather than paid before de-
linquent for the years 1943 to 1949 inclusive plain-
tiff would come under the provisions of this general 
7 year statute. This section was amended in 1951 
for the specific purpose of helping to validate these 
tax titles under which the plaintiff holds and plain-
tiff has established title under this 4 year statute 
of limitations. 
The fact situation in this case is identical with 
the fact situation set forth in the case of Hansen vs. 
Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884, wherein this 
Court upheld the validity of this 4 year statute of 
limitations on tax titles and quieted the title of the 
tax sale purchaser after he had held the property 
for a period in excess of 4 years after receiving a 
tax deed from the County, and the original owner 
had not been in possession during this 4 ~~ear period. 
The trial court, therefore, properly found that 
plaintiff's title had been purchased from San Juan 
County by a tax deed, that his title '-rns a tax title, 
that he had been in open, notorious and adverse 
possession of the property continuously sinee 1943 
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and had paid the taxes on said property for a period 
of 5 consecutive years. Pursuant to the findings 
the court properly decreed that plaintiff was the 
owner of this property. There is ample evidence to 
support the court's findings as detailed above. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Defendant is barred from asserting any de-
fense to plaintiff's complaint or from asserting any 
right, title or interest in said property by reason of 
the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles and 
also by reason of the general 7 year statute of limi-
tations. 
2. Plaintiff has established a good and valid 
title by adverse possession and payment of taxes 
under the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles. 
3. There was ample evidence to support plain-
tiff's findings and the trial court's findings and 
decree should be sustained. 
4. Even if the lower court is not sustained, 
the case should be remanded back for further pro-
ceedings for a new trial and for proceedings in ac-
eorc1_aneP with Section 59-10-65, UCA, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANDSEN AND KELLEH. 
By Dnane A. Frandsen 
Price, Utah 
F. BENNION REDD 
lvionticello, Utah 
Attorneys for J>zm:nt 1ff a·nrl 
n rspnn r7 rnt 
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